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stack [3]–[6], including in security tasks such as input
validation [7], [8] and web application ﬁrewalls [9], [10].
Unfortunately, regexes can themselves cause a security vul
nerability because of the high worst-case time complexity
of backtracking-based regex engine implementations. This
algorithmic complexity vulnerability is known as Regular
Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) [11], [12]. For ex
ample, ReDoS caused service outages at Stack Overﬂow
in 2016 [13] and at Cloudﬂare in 2019 [14]. Researchers
report hundreds of vulnerable regexes in the software supply
chain [2] and in live web services [15], [16].
Many approaches have been proposed to address the
ReDoS problem. Our work builds on those that try to detect
and ﬁx regexes. In this vein, some researchers character
ized vulnerable regexes into anti-patterns for manual use
by developers [2]. Others proposed tools to automatically
detect [17]–[26] or ﬁx [27]–[30] vulnerable regexes. All of
these approaches have been evaluated solely via automatic
experiments. Their usability has not been studied, jeopar
dizing their impact in practice [31] — 95% of developers
reject tools when they cannot understand the results [31].
The goal of this paper is to improve the usability of
existing ReDoS defenses. Our insight is that the usability
of existing tools to detect and ﬁx regexes will improve if
we complement them with anti-patterns and ﬁx strategies
of vulnerable regexes. We speciﬁcally aim to improve de
veloper understanding of the outcome of the tools.
For this goal, we developed novel anti-patterns for vul
nerable regexes, and a collection of ﬁx strategies to ﬁx them.
We derive our anti-patterns and ﬁx strategies from our novel
theory of regex inﬁnite ambiguity (IA). Our theory charac
terizes a fundamental component of vulnerable regexes: their
inﬁnitely ambiguous (IA) region. The IA region is what the
state of the art anti-patterns characterize [2], what many
detection tools detect, e.g., [18], [20], and what developers
often ﬁx in vulnerable regexes [2]. We refer to regexes
with an IA region as IA regexes. Our anti-patterns and ﬁx
strategies complement existing detection and ﬁxing tools, (1)
by helping developers better understand the IA region of the
vulnerable regex detected by the tool; and (2) by providing
understandable ﬁx strategies in addition to the ones proposed
by ﬁxing tools.
Our evaluation proceeded in four phases: proving our

Abstract—Regular expressions are used for diverse purposes,
including input validation and ﬁrewalls. Unfortunately, they
can also lead to a security vulnerability called ReDoS (Regular
Expression Denial of Service), caused by a super-linear worstcase execution time during regex matching. Due to the severity
and prevalence of ReDoS, past work proposed automatic tools
to detect and ﬁx regexes. Although these tools were evaluated in
automatic experiments, their usability has not yet been studied;
usability has not been a focus of prior work. Our insight is
that the usability of existing tools to detect and ﬁx regexes
will improve if we complement them with anti-patterns and
ﬁx strategies of vulnerable regexes.
We developed novel anti-patterns for vulnerable regexes,
and a collection of ﬁx strategies to ﬁx them. We derived our
anti-patterns and ﬁx strategies from a novel theory of regex in
ﬁnite ambiguity — a necessary condition for regexes vulnerable
to ReDoS. We proved the soundness and completeness of our
theory. We evaluated the effectiveness of our anti-patterns, both
in an automatic experiment and when applied manually. Then,
we evaluated how much our anti-patterns and ﬁx strategies
improve developers’ understanding of the outcome of detection
and ﬁxing tools. Our evaluation found that our anti-patterns
were effective over a large dataset of regexes (N=209,188):
100% precision and 99% recall, improving the state of the
art 50% precision and 87% recall. Our anti-patterns were
also more effective than the state of the art when applied
manually (N=20): 100% developers applied them effectively
vs. 50% for the state of the art. Finally, our anti-patterns
and ﬁx strategies increased developers’ understanding using
automatic tools (N=9): from median “Very weakly” to median
“Strongly” when detecting vulnerabilities, and from median
“Very weakly” to median “Very strongly” when ﬁxing them.
Index Terms—Regular expression denial of service, Usability

1. Introduction
Regular expressions (regexes) are a tool for text pro
cessing [1], [2]. Regexes are used across the system
∗ Sk Adnan Hassan is currently employed at Walmart Inc.
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Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid, Spain.
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theory, and then running three experiments. First, we for
mally proved the IA theory on which our anti-patterns are
based (§4 and §B). Second, since we deliberately introduced
inaccuracy in our anti-patterns in favor of simplicity, we
evaluated their effectiveness in an automatic experiment. We
compared our anti-patterns to the state-of-the-art ones over a
large dataset of regexes (§7). Third, since low usability may
lower effectiveness in manual use [31], we also evaluated
the effectiveness of our anti-patterns when applied manually.
We compared our anti-patterns to the state-of-the-art ones
in a human-subjects experiment, simulating a context in
which developers often prefer manual techniques [31], e.g.,
when tools disrupt developer workﬂow, such as in regex
composition or when working with simple regexes (§8).
Fourth, for more complex tasks, developers may prefer to
use automatic tools. So, we also evaluated how our antipatterns and ﬁx strategies complement the usage of existing
automatic tools by improving their usability. In a second
human-subjects experiment (§9), we measured if our antipatterns improve the understanding of the outcome of tools
to (a) detect and (b) ﬁx vulnerable regexes (§9). To the
best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study of the usability
of anti-patterns or tools to detect or ﬁx vulnerable regexes
when applied by humans.
Our evaluation provided multiple ﬁndings. First, our
underlying theory of regex inﬁnite ambiguity was sound
and complete. Second, our anti-patterns provided higher
effectiveness (100% precision, 99% recall) than the state
of the art anti-patterns [2] (50% precision, 87% recall)
over a dataset of 209,188 real-world regexes [32]. Third,
novice and intermediate developers (100% of 20 studied)
increased their effectiveness at identifying IA in regexes
over 5 different regex tasks, improving from a success rate
of 50% to a rate of 100%. Fourth, the 9 expert developers
who used our anti-patterns to complement detection tools
increased their understanding of what makes a detected
regex vulnerable: from median “Very weakly” to median
“Strongly”. Similarly, when using our ﬁx strategies to com
plement ﬁxing tools, they increased their understanding of
what makes the resulting ﬁxed regex not vulnerable: from
median “Very weakly” to median “Very strongly”.
This paper provides the following contributions:
1) A sound and complete theory of regex inﬁnite ambiguity
(§4).
2) Derived from this theory, IA anti-patterns (§5) and IA
ﬁx strategies (§6).
3) A quantitative evaluation of the comprehensiveness of
our IA anti-patterns over the largest dataset of real-world
regexes, showing that they capture IA effectively in a
wide proportion of them (§7).
4) The ﬁrst usability evaluation of characterizations of vul
nerable regexes, showing that our IA anti-patterns were
usable enough for novice developers to apply effectively
in the absence of tools (§8).
5) The ﬁrst usability evaluation of tools to detect and ﬁx
vulnerable regexes, showing that our IA anti-patterns and
IA ﬁx strategies improved their usability by improving
their understanding (§9).

Our paper provides a replication package [33] (see §A).

2. Background
Regular Expressions (Regexes) and Ambiguity:
Regexes. Kleene proposed regular expressions as a nota
tion to specify a language, i.e., a set of strings [34]. With a
ﬁnite alphabet of terminal symbols, Σ, and metacharacters,
‘|’, ‘·’, and ‘∗’, ther regular
syntax
r
r is [35]:
r r expression
r
r
r r r
R → φ r E r σ r R1 |R2 r R1 ·R2 r R1 ∗
where φ denotes the empty language; E is the empty string;
the characters σ ∈ Σ are terminal symbols; R1 |R2 alter
nates; R1 ·R2 concatenates;
and R∗ repeats. The language
∗
function L : R → 2Σ gives semantics:
L(φ) = φ
L(R1 |R2 ) = L(R1 ) ∪ L(R2 )
L(E) = {E}
L(R1 ·R2 ) = L(R1 )·L(R2 )
L(σ) = {σ} L(R∗) = L(R)∗
These semantics apply to Kleene’s regexes, and extend
to “syntax sugar” notations such as character ranges [a-c].
In practice, regexes may include non-regular features such
as lookaround assertions, backreferences, and possessive
quantiﬁers [36]. These features are used in less than 10% of
real-world regexes [1], [32], [37]. We therefore focus on the
common case of Kleene-regular regexes, denoted K-regexes.
Regex Ambiguity. The regex language semantics allow
membership to be checked with a parser. A regex is ambigu
ous if there is a string in its language that can be matched by
more than one parse tree [25], [38]. For example, the regex
a|a can parse the input “a” in two ways, i.e., yielding two
parse trees, one using the left a and one the right.
For K-regexes, a regex match is equivalent to simulating
an input on a corresponding non-deterministic ﬁnite automa
ton (NFA) [39]. To simplify discussion, we will reason about
regex ambiguity over an equivalent, ambiguity-preserving,
E-free NFA [19], [40]. From the NFA perspective, a regex
is ambiguous if there is a string that can be accepted along
multiple paths of this NFA.
Inﬁnitely Ambiguous (IA) Regex. Regexes have vari
ous degrees of ambiguity [41], [42]: no ambiguity; ﬁnite
(bounded regardless of input length); or inﬁnite in input
length. Inﬁnite ambiguity (IA) leads to super-linear time
complexity in some parsing algorithms (e.g., backtrack
ing) [18], [20]. A regex is inﬁnitely ambiguous if it has
an inﬁnitely ambiguous (IA) region (equivalently, an NFA
section), i.e., a region with the inﬁnite-degree-of-ambiguity
(IDA) property [40]. Given an E-free ﬁnite automaton A,
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for A to be inﬁnitely
ambiguous are given by Weber & Seidl [40].
IDA can be of two types: (1) polynomially IDA (PDA),
and (2) exponentially IDA (EDA). Figure 1(a) illustrates
a polynomially IDA (PDA) section in a regex’s NFA. A
substring label(πi ) can be matched in the loop π1 at node p,
the path π2 from p to q , or in the loop π3 at q . For example,
consider the regex a*a* for an input “aa...a” of length N .
As any two partitions of the input can be matched with the
ﬁrst a* and second a*, there are N matching paths.
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label(π1 ) = label(π2 ) = label(π3 )
π1
π
...
...
p 2 q ... ...

3. Related Work

label(π1 ) = label(π2 )
π1
... ... p ... ...

Empirical measurements of ReDoS in practice: Although
the ReDoS attack was proposed twenty years ago by Crosby
and Wallach [11], [48], researchers have only recently at
tempted to estimate its impact. In 2018, Davis et al. reported
that vulnerable regexes were present in many popular opensource software modules, and that engineers struggled to
ﬁx them [2]; in 2019, they observed that these regexes
displayed super-linear behavior in the built-in regex engines
used in most mainstream programming languages [32], [37].
Concurrently, Staicu & Pradel showed that 10% of Node.js
based web services were vulnerable to ReDoS due to their
use of vulnerable npm modules [15]. In 2022, Barlas et
al. studied the impact of ReDoS in live web services [16].
Even in non-backtracking engines, Turoňová et al. observed
the impact of ReDoS [49]. These ﬁndings motivated further
research into the ReDoS problem.

π2
π3
(a) PDA (or IDAd )
(b) EDA
Figure 1: Illustration of Polynomial and Exponential De
gree of Ambiguity (PDA, EDA) in the NFA [40]. We say
that (p, π2 , q) is a transition from state p to state q via
label(π2 ) [20].

Figure 1(b) illustrates an exponentially IDA (EDA) sec
tion in a regex’s NFA. A substring label(πi ) can be matched
in either of two loops π1 or π2 at node p. Consider the
example regex (a|a)*. Each ‘a’ of the input “a...a” can
be matched by either the upper or lower loop, and thus the
total number of matching paths becomes 2N .
Regex-Based Denial of Service (ReDoS): Regex-based
Denial of Service (ReDoS) [11] is a security vulnerability —
an algorithmic complexity attack [11] by which a web ser
vice’s computational resources are diverted from legitimate
client interactions into an expensive regex match, degrading
its quality of service. Following Davis et al. [43], ReDoS
involves three Conditions:

Characterizations to Manually Detect Vulnerable
Regexes: In past work, Davis et al. characterized the IA
region of vulnerable regexes with anti-patterns, although
with a high false positive rate [2]. Brabrand & Thomsen’s
theories precisely identify unambiguous regexes, but treat
all others as suspect, including both IA regexes and merely
ﬁnitely ambiguous (i.e., non-vulnerable) regexes [38]. 1
In contrast with Davis et al.’s anti-patterns, we provide
a theoretical grounding to formally capture their limitations
(§4) and thus provide higher precision and recall (§7).
We also evaluate their usability when applied manually
by humans (§8). In contrast with Brabrand & Thomsen’s,
our theory distinguishes between ﬁnite and inﬁnite ambi
guity, enabling developers to distinguish between likelyunproblematic (non-IA) and problematic (IA) regexes.
Finally, other characterizations of vulnerable regexes
exist, but they were not proposed to be applied manually by
humans. Instead, they follow the models used by automatic
detection tools, e.g., expressed as ﬁnite automata [18], [20]
(see Figure 1). Contrasting with these other characteriza
tions, we designed ours to be consumed by humans. Our
approach uses the modality of the regex language—the
representation that developers understand best [50], [51].

(C1) a backtracking regex engine used in evaluation, and
(C2) a vulnerable regex, applied to evaluate
(C3) a malign input.
C1-Backtracking Regex Engine. Many regex engines
(e.g., versions of PHP, Perl, JavaScript, Java, Python,
Ruby, and C#) use a backtracking search algorithm, e.g.,
Spencer’s [44], to answer regex queries [32], [45].
C2-Vulnerable Regex. A vulnerable regex is an IA regex
whose NFA has a preﬁx region, followed by an IA region
(either PDA or EDA), followed by a sufﬁx region [20]. The
IA region is a necessary component and the root cause of
the regex’s vulnerability. The preﬁx must be considered to
reach this IA region, and the sufﬁx must typically lead to a
mismatch in order to trigger backtracking.
C3-Malign Input. An attacker-controlled malign input
triggers the super-linear behavior of a vulnerable regex by
driving the backtracking engine into evaluating a polynomi
ally or exponentially large number of possible NFA paths.
The exploration exhausts computational resources [17].

Tools to Automatically Detect Vulnerable Regexes:
Berglund et al. deﬁned a prioritized type of NFA to simulate
a backtracking engine in Java and decide if a regex could
show super-linear behavior [17]. Weideman et al. also use
a prioritized NFA to ﬁnd IDA in it [18], [19]. Wustholz et
al. also looks for the IDA pattern in the NFA and computes
an attack automaton that produces attack input strings [20]
. Liu et al. adds support for modeling and analyzing less
common regex features, e.g., set operations [21]. Li et
al. prescribed ﬁve vulnerability patterns, although without
theoretical validation [52].
Others statically analyze different representations of the
regex for vulnerability. Kirrage et al. analyze an abstract

Threat model. We suppose the following threat model
for ReDoS, aligned with the common use of regexes for
input sanitization in web software [1], [20], [46]. The
victim’s regex engine uses a backtracking regex engine
(ReDoS Condition 1), which is common for many serverside programming languages. The victim uses a regex (C2)
to sanitize attacker-controlled input (C3).
ReDoS in practice. Davis et al. reported two high-proﬁle
examples of ReDoS affecting millions of users [43], [47].
In §C we note growing ReDoS CVEs from 2010 to present.

1. Finite ambiguity could cause ReDoS for complex regexes [49] or
when resources are limited (e.g., a low-power device like a Raspberry Pi).
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evaluation tree of the regex [22]. Rathnayake et al. look
for exponential branching in the regex evaluation tree [23].
Sugiyama et al. analyzes the size of a tree transducer for
the regex [24]. Finally, Sulzmann et al. use Brzozowski
derivatives to create a ﬁnite state transducer to generate
parse trees and minimal counter-examples [25].
Still other approaches detect vulnerable regexes using
dynamic analysis. Shen et al. and McLaughlin et al. pro
posed search algorithms to ﬁnd inputs with super-linear
matching time [26] [53]. More general algorithmic com
plexity detectors, e.g., [54]–[58], can also be extended to
detect ReDoS.
Vulnerable regex detection tools have been evaluated for
effectiveness, but not for usability. Our anti-patterns com
plement these tools by improving developer understanding
of the outcome of their detection (§9).

non-regular regex features [43].

4. Theory of Regex Inﬁnite Ambiguity
Here we introduce an existing theory of regex ambiguity
[38], discuss its limitations, and present our novel theorems.
Recalling §2, a regex with an inﬁnite degree of am
biguity (IA) [40] has the necessary condition for superlinear regex behavior [2], [11], [48]. Though the NFA-level
conditions for IA regexes (namely PDA and EDA regions)
are well known [40], we lack characterizations in terms of
regex syntax and semantics. We provide such a description
to support developers assessing or composing regexes.
Preliminaries: Brabrand & Thomsen [38] developed the
state of the art description of regex-level ambiguity. They
introduced an overlap operator, ∨
∩ , between two languages
L(R1 ) and L(R2 ). The set L(R1 ) ∨
∩ L(R2 ) contains the
ambiguity-inducing strings that can be parsed in multi
ple ways across L(R1 ) and L(R2 ). More formally, with
X = L(R1 ) and Y = L(R2 ),

Tools to Automatically Fix Vulnerable Regexes: These
approaches offer trade-offs for the ﬁxed regex, in: semantic
similarity, (perceived) readability, and support for uncom
mon features. Van der Merwe et al. presented a modiﬁed
ﬂow algorithm to convert an ambiguous K-regex into an
equivalent unambiguous one [27], with perfect semantic
equivalence, but lower readability. More recently, Li et al.
proposed an approach to ﬁx vulnerable regexes with deter
ministic regex constraints to avoid regex ambiguity [29].
Chida & Terauchi proposed a “Programming By Exam
ple” approach that supports K-regexes, lookarounds, capture
groups, and backreferences [59]. Both approaches use a hu
man in the loop to provide good examples [29], [59]. Finally,
Claver et al. [30] proposed a synthesis-based approach that
they evaluate with synthetic regexes.
These tools have been evaluated for effectiveness, but
not for usability. Our ﬁx strategies complement these tools
by improving developer’ understanding of the ﬁx (§9).

∗
+
X∨
∩ Y = {xay | x, y ∈ Σ ∧a ∈ Σ s.t. x, xa ∈ X∧ay, y ∈ Y }

Using this operator, Theorem 0 summarizes their ﬁndings.
Theorem 0 (Brabrand & Thomsen [38]). Given unam
biguous regexes R1 and R2 :
(a) R1 |R2 is unambiguous iff L(R1 ) ∩ L(R2 ) = φ.
(b) R1 ·R2 is unambiguous iff L(R1 ) ∨
∩ L(R2 ) = φ.
(c) R1 ∗ is unambiguous iff E ∈
/ L(R1 ) ∧
L(R1 ) ∨
∩ L(R1 ∗) = φ.
In their implementation of this Theorem, Brabrand &
Thomsen use Møller’s BRICS library [73], and actually rely
on what we call the Møller overlap operator, Ω. We use
this operator in our theorems. The Møller overlap operator
describes only the ambiguous core “a”:

Non-regex-based Workarounds:
Recovering From ReDoS. After a system containing a
ReDoS vulnerability is deployed, it is possible to detect
and mitigate ReDoS attacks. Bai et al. proposed a ReDoS
speciﬁc approach, applying deep learning to detect and sand
box attack strings [60]. Atre et al. proposed using adversarial
scheduling to mitigate adversarial complexity attacks [61].
Approaches that detect anomalous resource utilization, e.g.,
time [62], CPU [57], or application-level concepts [63], can
also mitigate ReDoS. These approaches reduce the impact
of ReDoS, but do not remove the root cause.
Changing the regex engine. There are both classic and
more recent alternatives to the exponential-time backtrack
ing regex algorithm. The earliest published regex match
ing algorithms, by Brzozowski in 1964 [64] and Thomp
son in 1968 [65], offer linear-time guarantees. There are
production-grade implementations of Thompson’s approach,
notably RE2 [66] and the engines in Rust [67] and
Go [68]. Microsoft has considered Brzozowski’s approach
for .NET [69], as well as deterministic [70], [71] or hy
brid [72] matching strategies. However, programming lan
guage maintainers have been slow to adopt these algorithms
because of the risk of regression and the limited support for

X Ω Y = {∃ x, y ∈ Σ∗ ∧a | a ∈ Σ+ s.t. x, xa ∈ X∧ay, y ∈ Y }

Limitation: Given unambiguous regex components, Theo
rem 0 speciﬁes when a composed regex remains unambigu
ous. Yet not all ambiguity is harmful. For example, the regex
\w|\d is ﬁnitely ambiguous. This regex formulation may
improve readability [74]; it is not a ReDoS risk.
Regex Inﬁnite Ambiguity Theorems:
This section
presents our regex ambiguity theory for composition with
alternation (Theorem 1), concatenation (Theorem 2), and
star (Theorem 3). Here we give proof sketches, examples,
and the ReDoS implications. Full proofs are in §B.
Theorem 1 (Ambiguity of Alternation). Given unam
biguous regexes R1 and R2 ,
(a) R1 |R2 is ﬁnitely ambiguous iff L(R1 ) ∩ L(R2 ) =
φ.
(b) R1 |R2 cannot be inﬁnitely ambiguous.
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Proof sketch: The theorem states that given unambiguous
regexes R1 and R2 , if R1 |R2 is ambiguous, then it is always
ﬁnitely ambiguous. Since R1 and R2 are both unambiguous,
for any matching input w, there is only one path through
R1 and R2 . Therefore, for R1 |R2 and any matching input
w, there are at most two matching paths.

Proof sketch: The theorem states that given an unambigu
ous regex R, if R∗ is ambiguous, then it is always inﬁnitely
ambiguous. Suppose R∗ is ambiguous. Then there is some
input w that it can match in k ways, k > 1. So there is an
input ww that it can match in k ∗ k = k 2 ways. The degree
of ambiguity increases as a function of input length.

Example: For regex a*|a*, consider input “a...a” of
length N . Regardless of input length, the number of ac
cepting paths will be 2: via the ﬁrst a∗ or the second a∗.

Example: For the regex (a*)*, consider input “aaa...a”
of length N . There are two ways (inner * or outer *) to
match each ‘a’, making the total number of ways to match
to be 2N .

ReDoS implications: If two regexes R1 and R2 are unam
biguous, R1 |R2 is always safe (cannot form IA).

ReDoS implications: Even though an original regex R is
unambiguous, R∗ can be IA. In §5, we give an anti-pattern
that only checks for a subset of conditions for simplicity.

Theorem 2 (Ambiguity of Concatenation). Sup
pose unambiguous regexes R1 and R2 , and that
L(R1 ) ∨
∩ L(R2 ) = φ (so R1 ·R2 is ambiguous by The
orem 0). Then:
(a) R1 ·R2 is inﬁnitely ambiguous iff L(R1 ) contains
the language of a regex BC*D and L(R2 ) contains
the language of a regex EF*G, where E ∈
/ L(C) ∧
E∈
/ L(F) ∧ L(C) ∩ L(F) ∩ L(DE) = φ.
(b) Otherwise, R1 ·R2 must be ﬁnitely ambiguous.

Theorem 4. Given a ﬁnitely ambiguous regex R, R∗
is always inﬁnitely ambiguous.
Proof sketch: The proof follows the logic of Theorem 3.
Example: For the regex (a|a)*, consider an input
“aaa...a” of length N . There are two ways (ﬁrst a or second
a) to match each ‘a’ of the input, for 2N matches in all.
ReDoS implications: If R is ﬁnitely ambiguous, from
alternation (R = P |Q) or concatenation (R = P ·Q), R∗
is always IA. Later in §5, we introduce two anti-patterns of
the form (P |Q)∗.

Proof sketch: ⇐= : Consider the string “bcc...cdeff...fg”
∈ L(R1 · R2 ) where c = f = de. It can be divided into
two strings “bcc...cd” ∈ L(BC*D) ⊆ L(R1 ) and “eff...fg”
∈ L(EF*G) ⊆ L(R2 ). By hypothesis, we can repeat the
substring “de” arbitrarily many times, and the resulting
string can be matched in R1 (by C*) or in R2 (by F*). We
can choose an arbitrarily long string and obtain arbitrary
ambiguity in R1 ·R2 .
=⇒ : Suppose R1 ·R2 is inﬁnitely ambiguous. The NFA
corresponding to R1 ·R2 cannot contain the EDA structure
because this requires a self-loop — i.e., that R1 or R2
is already ambiguous. Therefore the NFA of R1 ·R2 must
contain a PDA structure, as shown in Figure 1(a). We can
map the two loops π1 and π3 with C* and F* respectively;
and the bridge π2 with DE in the regex representation, where
L(C) ∩ L(F) ∩ L(DE) = φ.

5. Anti-patterns for Regex Inﬁnite Ambiguity
This section describes anti-patterns for IA regexes (IA
anti-patterns), derived from the preceding theory of regex
inﬁnite ambiguity. Ideal anti-patterns would be as sound
and complete as the theory, but this goal must be balanced
against usability. With this in mind, we iteratively extracted
IA anti-patterns from the theory by dropping clauses from
theorems or combining the theorems in different ways.
These anti-patterns were reﬁned through internal discussion.
We evaluate these anti-patterns in §7 and §8.
Table 1 summarizes our IA anti-patterns. As alternation
alone does not make a regex IA (Theorem 1), there are
Concatenation anti-patterns derived from Theorem 2, and
Star anti-patterns derived from Theorems 3 and 4.

Example: For regex (a*a)(aa*) on input “aa...a” of
length N , there are N accepting computations, one for each
of the indices of the input dividing the string into a left half
consumed by R1 and a right half consumed by R2 .

Concatenation Anti-patterns: The Concat anti-patterns
come from Theorem 2. In Theorem 2, a regex R concate
nates regexes R1 and R2 that contain the languages BC*D
and EF*G, respectively. The theorem states that the potential
vulnerability occurs in the sub-regex C*DEF*, which we
write in simpliﬁed form as P*SQ* for our anti-patterns. We
call S the “bridge” between P* and Q*.
Concat-1. This anti-pattern, where P ∗ Q∗ is a sub-regex
of R, represents the simplest form without the bridge S .
Developers must ﬁnd a string matched in both P ∗ and Q∗.
Concat-2. This anti-pattern, where P ∗SQ∗ is a sub-regex
of R, has the bridge S component. Developers must ﬁnd a
string matched in all P ∗, Q∗, and S .

ReDoS implications: Though two regexes R1 and R2 are
unambiguous, R1 ·R2 could be IA, thus concatenation should
be used with care. Theorem 2(a) implies that for R1 ·R2
to be IA, there must be a star component in both R1 and
R2 . In §5, we introduce three forms of concatenation antipatterns based on this observation.
Theorem 3 (Ambiguity of Star). Given unambiguous
regex R,
(a) R∗ is inﬁnitely ambiguous iff E ∈ L(R) ∨
L(R) Ω L(R∗) = φ.
(b) R∗ cannot be ﬁnitely ambiguous.
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Table 1: Our proposed IA anti-patterns. Each row indicates the anti-pattern, the theorem(s) from which it was derived, a
description, and an example of how the anti-pattern leads to ambiguity.
Anti-pattern

Thm.

Description

Example

Concat 1

2

R = ...P*Q*... (R has a sub-regex P*Q*) — The two
quantiﬁed parts P* and Q* can match some shared string s.

\w*\d* — both classes can match digits [0
9].

Concat 2

2

R = ...P*SQ*... — The two quantiﬁed parts P* and Q*
can match a string s from the middle part S .

\w*0\d* — the repeated classes \w and \d
can match the middle part 0.

Concat 3

2

R = ...P*S*Q*... — Advanced form of Concat 1. Since
S* includes an empty string, the ambiguity between P* and
Q* can be realized.

\w*:*\d* — The classes \w and \d overlap,
and the intervening :* can be skipped.

Star 1

1, 4

R*, R= (P|Q|...) — There is an intersection between
any two alternates, i.e., both match some shared strings.

(\w|\d)* — both classes match digits [0-9].

Star 2

3

R*, R= (P|Q|...) — You can make one option of the
alternation by repeating another option multiple times or by
concatenating two or more options multiple times.

(a|b|ab)* — The 3rd option, ab, matches
combinations of the ﬁrst and second options.

Star 3

3

R*, R= (...P*...) — Nested quantiﬁers, provided RR
follows any of the Concat anti-patterns.

Expanding R=(0?\w*)* to RR yields
0?\w*0?\w*, which is IA by Concat 3.
Similarly, R=(xy*)* yields xy*xy*; this is
not IA by any Concat anti-pattern.

Concat-3. This anti-pattern, where P ∗ S ∗ Q∗ is a sub
regex of R, is the case with optional bridge S . Like Concat
1, developers must ﬁnd a string matched in both P ∗ and Q∗.

knowledge that a nested quantiﬁer (e.g., (P ∗)∗) is bad [75],
the Star-3 anti-pattern only considers the case where R has
a sub-regex P ∗, as a generalized form of nested quantiﬁers.
The Star-3 anti-pattern further simpliﬁes the condition and
asks developers to consider the overlap between L(R) and
(twice-repeated) L(R·R), using the Concat anti-patterns.

Gap Analysis: The Concat anti-patterns represent all possi
ble ways that the bridge component DE (from Theorem 2)
may appear as a sub-regex of the form E, S , or S∗. Thus,
there is no gap between theory and anti-patterns.

Gap Analysis: The Star-3 anti-pattern does not incorporate
all the conditions in Theorem 3. Regexes with the missing
conditions would appear as false negatives.

Star Anti-patterns: The Star anti-patterns come from The
orem 3 and Theorem 4.
Star-1 and Star-2. These anti-patterns are designed to pre
vent (some) regexes of the form R∗ where R = (P |Q|...).
Theorem 4 states that if R is ﬁnitely ambiguous, then
R∗ becomes IA. From Theorem 1(a), alternations may
introduce ﬁnite ambiguity. The Star-1 anti-pattern describe
the condition when the subregex (P |Q|...) becomes ﬁnitely
ambiguous. The Star-2 anti-pattern describe the condition
when the non-ambiguous (P |Q|...) form IA with the help ∗
according to Theorem 3.

6. Fix Strategies for Regex Inﬁnite Ambiguity
This section describes ﬁve ﬁx strategies (F1–F5) that can
be broadly applied across the different IA anti-patterns. The
ﬁx strategies are derived from various ways of invalidating
necessary conditions of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3. The
proposed ﬁx strategies do not always preserve semantics.
Fix strategies: Table 2 summarizes the proposed ﬁve ﬁx
strategies along with examples for each anti-pattern. We
evaluate their effectiveness in Experiment 3 (§9).
1) The ﬁrst ﬁx strategy (F1) is to add a delimiter between
the subregexes P and Q of the anti-patterns (e.g., P*Q*,
(P|Q)*) that can match the shared string(s). More
precisely, the delimiter makes L(C) ∩ L(DE) = φ
and/or L(F ) ∩ L(DE) = φ in Theorem 2(a); and
L(R) Ω L(R∗) = φ in Theorem 3(a). For instance,
consider the regex \w*\d* (Concat 1). If we add a
delimiter ‘:’, the new regex \w*:\d* becomes non-IA
because L(\w) ∩ L(:) = φ and L(\d) ∩ L(:) = φ.
Table 2 provides examples for the other anti-patterns.
2) The second ﬁx strategy (F2) is to reduce one of the sub
regexes P and Q so that it no longer matches any of the
shared strings. In other words, the ﬁx F2 makes L(C) ∩
L(F ) = φ in Theorem 2(a); and L(R) Ω L(R∗) = φ

Gap Analysis: There is a gap between Theorem 4 and
the Star-1 anti-pattern. Star-1 does not consider all possi
ble forms of ﬁnitely ambiguous regexes. For instance, the
concatenation may also introduce ﬁnite ambiguity (Theo
rem 2(b)). Thus, some regexes of the form (P ·Q)∗ could be
IA as well: e.g., ((a|ab)(c|bc))*. Also, the Star-2 antipattern is one of the conditions that incorporate Theorem 3.
Thus regexes under missing conditions would appear as false
negatives for these anti-patterns.
Star-3. This anti-pattern prevent (some) regexes of the
form R∗ where R has a sub-regex P ∗. Theorem 3 states
the conditions when R∗ becomes IA. considering the ﬁrst
condition E ∈ L(R) is relatively trivial. Yet, the second
condition L(R)ΩL(R∗) = φ requires reasoning about a
language overlap between L(R) and an arbitrary repetition
of L(R∗), which could be tricky. Based on the common
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Table 2: Fix strategies. Each strategy is illustrated with respect to each anti-pattern, within the limit of the example provided.
Fix Description
Add a delimiter between the
F1 sub-regexes P and Q that
can match a shared string.
Reduce one of the sub-regexes
F2 P and Q so that it no longer
matches any of the shared strings.
Reduce both the sub-regexes
P and Q so that they no longer
match any of the shared strings,
F3 and add the shared string(s) in a
disjunction. In many cases, this
will resemble making a superset
of the two sub-regexes.

Concat 1
Anti-pattern: ...P*Q*...
Example: \w*\d*

Concat 2
...P*SQ*...
\w*0\d*

Concat 3
...P*S*Q*...
\w*:*\d*

Star 1
(P|Q|...)*
(\w|\d)*

Star 2
(P|Q|...)*
(a|b|ab)*

Star 3
(...P*...)*
(0?\w*)*

Freq.

\w*:\d*

\w*:0\d*

\w*:+\d*

(\w*|:\d)*

(a:|b|ab)*

(:0?\w*)*

12

[a-zA-Z ]*\d*

[a-zA-Z ]*0\d*

(b|ab)*

(0?[a-zA-Z ])*

10

\w*

N/A

(a|b)*

\w*

3

Reduce or remove repetition in at
F4 least one of the sub-regexes
P and Q that match a shared string.

\w{,10}\d{,10}

Remove or substantially modify
F5 the sub-regexes P and Q and
add logic for the semantic changes.

add logic to
catch non-digits
then use \d*

[a-zA-Z ]*:*\d* ([a-zA-Z ]|\d)*

N/A

\w{,10}0\d{,10} \w{,10}:*\d{,10}

add logic to
catch non-digits
then use 0\d*

add logic to
catch non-digits
then use :*\d*

\w*

(\w|\d){,10} (a|b|ab){,10} (0?\w{,10}){,10}

\w*|\d*

a+|b+|(ab)+

add logic to
catch 0, then
use \w*

13

16

Evaluation of Practical Relevance: We analyzed the 54
developer-created regex ﬁxes reported by Davis et al. [2].
We classiﬁed each ﬁx into one of these ﬁve strategies. The
last column in Table 2 reports the frequency of each ﬁx
strategy. We also observed that developers value simplicity
in the ﬁx. To preserve the original (vulnerable) regex’s
structure, they introduced semantic changes (51/54 = 94%).

in Theorem 3(a). For instance, refer to the same regex
\w*\d* (Concat 1). If we reduce \w to [A-Za-z_]
so that it does not overlap with \d, the new regex
[A-Za-z_]*\d* is not IA since L([A-Za-z_]) ∩
L(\d) = φ.
3) The third ﬁx strategy (F3) is to reduce the subregexes P
and Q so that they no longer match any of the shared
strings, and add the shared string(s) in a disjunction.
In many cases, this will resemble making a superset
of the two sub-regexes. Effectively, the ﬁx F3 has the
same effect as F2 that excludes any shared string(s), yet
it additionally keeps the shared string(s) in a disjunc
tion, making the ﬁx semantic-preserving. For example,
consider (\w|\d)* (Star 1). Suppose we reduce \w
to [A-Za-z_] and reduce \d to null so that they no
longer match the shared string(s) [0-9]. Then we add
the subregex [0-9] in a disjunction. Finally, we get
([A-Za-z_]|[0-9])*, which is equivalent to \w*.
Note that \w is a superset of \w and \d, and the old
and new regexes match the same language.
4) The fourth ﬁx strategy (F4) is to reduce or remove
repetition in at least one of the subregexes P and Q
so that the shared string(s) cannot be matched inﬁnitely.
Both Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 require an unbounded
repetitions (a star quantiﬁer). The ﬁx F4 in effect turns
unbounded repetitions to bounded ones. For example in
Star 1 anti-pattern, we can replace the regex (\w|\d)*
with (\w|\d){0,10} permitting only up to 10 repe
titions.
5) The ﬁfth ﬁx strategy (F5) is to remove or substan
tially modify the subregexes P and Q and handle se
mantic changes elsewhere. The ﬁx F5 capture general
non-systematic ﬁxes that may introduce more semantic
changes than the other ﬁxes. For example, the regex
(\w|\d)* can be ﬁxed to \w*|\d*.

7. Experiment 1: Effectiveness of Anti-patterns
Our proposed IA anti-patterns (§5) were derived from
our theory (§4), but we deliberately introduced inaccuracy in
favor of simplicity. In this section, we evaluate the impact of
these deviations over the largest available regex corpus [32].
We measured effectiveness using precision and recall.

7.1. Experimental Design
Studied Techniques: Our IA anti-patterns. We detected
each anti-pattern using static analysis. We parsed regexes
in PCRE format [36] using an ANTLR 4 grammar and
parser [76]. We used the BRICS [73] tool to check whether
multiple sub-regex parts can generate any shared string.
We implemented our IA anti-patterns to support the
common case of K-regexes, i.e., regexes that use only
Kleene-regular regexes (cf. §2). Our prototype also ex
cludes extended POSIX and Unicode character classes for
simplicity. These limitations are consistent with past ap
proaches [17]–[20], [22]–[25].
State-of-the-art (SOA) anti-patterns. For comparison, we
also executed the state-of-the-art (SOA) anti-patterns that
characterize IA regexes [2]. We used the automatic detector
provided by Davis et al. [2]. These anti-patterns lack a

7

Table 3: State of the art IA anti-patterns, as described by
Davis et al. [2]. Each row indicates the anti-pattern, its
description. and an example.
Anti-pattern

Table 4: Comparison of Precision and Recall between our
IA anti-patterns and SOA anti-patterns.

Description

QOA
(Quantiﬁed
Overlapping
Adjacency)

The two quantiﬁed \w* nodes overlap, and
are adjacent because one can be reached from
the other by skipping the optional octothorpe.
From each node we walk forward looking
for a reachable quantiﬁed adjacent node with
Example:
an overlapping set of characters, stopping at
/\w*#?\w*/ the earliest of: a quantiﬁed overlapping node
(QOA), a non-overlapping non-optional node
(no QOA), or the end of the nodes (no QOA).
QOD
(Quantiﬁed
Overlapping
Disjunction)

Anti-patterns

Precision

Recall

Our IA anti-patterns
SOA anti-patterns [2]

100%
50%

99%
87%

BRICS library [73] used in our anti-pattern prototype. (3)
We discarded 1,054 additional regexes with POSIX or Uni
code character classes not supported by our implementation.
The implementation of our IA anti-patterns supports
450,753 regexes (83.8%) of the dataset (10.2% had advanced
or non-regular features; 6% unsupported by BRICS). This
level of completeness is comparable to prior research pro
totypes for regex analysis [20], [23], [43].
Finally, we measured regex generalizability metrics [37]
in the regexes that we kept and ﬁltered out. We found that
they were similar in median: length (18 vs. 19), paths (1 vs.
1), features (3 vs. 4), and ratio of IA regexes ﬂagged by our
anti-patterns (15% vs. 15.8%).

Here we have a quantiﬁed disjunction
(/(...|...)+/), whose two nodes overlap
in the digits, 0-9.

Example:
/(\w|\d)+/
Star height >1 To measure star height, we traverse the regex
and maintain a counter for each layer of
Example:
nested quantiﬁer: +, *, and check if the counter
/(a+)+/
reached a value higher than 1. In such cases,
the same string can be consumed by an inner
quantiﬁer or the outer one, as is the case for
the string “a” in the regex /(a+)+/.

7.2. Results
How Effective were Our IA Anti-patterns Compared to
the SOA Anti-patterns?. In Table 4, we report the results
for our studied anti-pattern families. It shows that our pro
posed IA anti-patterns provided a substantial improvement
in both precision (100% compared to 50%) and recall (99%
compared to 87%) when compared to the SOA anti-patterns.
Our IA anti-patterns addressed many of the false positives
of the SOA. For example, the Star height > 1 anti-pattern
can produce many false positives e.g., the non-IA regex
/(b*c)*/ has Star height = 2. Our IA anti-patterns also
reduced the number of false negatives of the SOA, e.g., for
regexes like (a|b)*(ab)* and (a|b|ab)*. The SOA
anti-patterns ﬁnd no overlap between (a|b) and (ab) and
would not label them as IA. In contrast, our Concat 1 and
Star 2 anti-patterns, respectively, would label both as IA.
We note that we observed higher precision and recall
achieved by the SOA anti-patterns than was reported by their
original study [2]. We suggest two reasons: we studied a
different dataset, and we assumed full match for unanchored
regexes (e.g., converting a+ to /ˆ.*?a+$/) [32]), which
reveals more IA regexes in the dataset.
Finally, we also performed a deeper investigation into
the root cause of the false negatives of our IA anti-patterns
(the 1% of IA regexes that they did not ﬂag as IA). The
false negatives in our experiment were mainly regexes with
constructions that were too complex for our current antipattern scripts to detect for the limitation of Star antipatterns discussed in §5. While this limitation of our im
plementation caused a few false negatives (affecting only
1% of IA regexes), our implementation is still sound for
our studied dataset — it caused no false positives.
How Prevalent was each of our IA Anti-patterns?. Table 5
shows the prevalence of each of our proposed IA antipatterns in our studied dataset, i.e., the ratio of IA regexes
that were detected by each IA anti-pattern. Note that the

theoretical basis, so we expect them to perform worse. Davis
et al. described three anti-patterns, listed in Table 32
Ground Truth: We assessed ground truth for whether a
regex is IA using Weideman et al.’s detector [18], [19].
This detector tests if a regex is IA by analyzing its NFA
(Figure 1). Since the Weideman tool uses automata theory
instead of regex semantic theory, it provides an independent
check on the anti-patterns (and our underlying theory).
Metrics: The standard metrics of precision and recall [77].
Dataset: We evaluated the studied anti-patterns in the
largest available dataset of real-world regexes [32] (537,806
regexes). This dataset has been used by previous studies for
measuring ReDoS [32], ﬁxing ReDoS [43], [78], and mea
suring general characteristics of regexes [37]. We analyzed
209,188 regexes from this dataset — one order of mag
nitude larger than the evaluation of past ReDoS-detection
approaches (15,000–30,000 regexes [18], [19], [21], [26]).
We curated the dataset for this experiment: (1) We
removed the 295,151 regexes that were not supported by
the ground truth tool [19]).3 According to our ground truth,
32,005 of our studied regexes were IA. (2) We discarded
32,413 additional regexes that were not supported by the
2. As might be expected, these anti-patterns resemble those presented
in Table 1. The main difference is in the nuanced deﬁnition of “overlap”
available from our IA theory.
3. While our implementation of our IA anti-patterns supported a larger
percentage of the dataset, we discarded those for which we could not collect
ground truth.
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Table 5: Prevalence of each of our proposed IA anti-patterns
within the studied dataset. As some regexes ﬁt multiple IA
anti-patterns, the ﬁnal row eliminates double-counting.
IA Anti-pattern

# Regexes

Prevalence

Concat 1
Concat 2
Concat 3
Star 1
Star 2
Star 3

17,349
12,419
414
192
639
1,133

54%
39%
1%
<1%
2%
4%

All anti-patterns

31,537

99%

anti-patterns and the state-of-the-art (SOA) ones. Among 20
participants, half (10) used our anti-patterns ﬁrst, and the
other half used the SOA ones ﬁrst. We measured whether
subjects correctly identiﬁed IA in their regexes.
Treatments: We showed subjects our IA anti-patterns
as described in Table 1 and the SOA anti-patterns using
verbatim text from Davis et al.’s original description of
the anti-pattern, and of how it should be applied (described
in Table 3). Note that we did not study a control group that
used no anti-patterns. Experiment 1 already answers what
a control group would show: when developers are given no
support, they write thousands of vulnerable regexes (§7).

prevalence ratios do not add up to 100%, since some IA
regexes may contain multiple anti-patterns.
We make multiple observations in this table. First, all our
IA anti-patterns as a group provided high recall (99%); false
negatives are rare. Second, we observed wide variations in
the prevalence of each individual anti-patterns. This means
that our set of anti-patterns could be further simpliﬁed and
still obtain very high recall altogether. Somebody wanting
to learn only a single anti-pattern could learn only Concat
1 and still cover 54% of IA regexes — adding Concat 2,
one would cover the large majority (> 90%) of IA regexes,
and so on. This conﬁrms past research that found that poly
nomial regexes were much more prevalent than exponential
ones [62]. We believe that this does not mean that developers
are already good at avoiding some anti-patterns, but instead
that the kinds of problems that would require a Concat
regex are more common than those that would require a
Star one. However, future work would be needed to answer
this question. Finally, before considering ignoring the less
common (lower prevalence) IA anti-patterns, one should
also consider their risk. While the star anti-patterns are less
common (about 6% of all IA regexes), they are riskier —
our theory shows that they lead to exponential ambiguity.

Tasks: Table 9 shows the 5 tasks of Experiment 2. Task
1 was an easy warm-up task, to familiarize subjects with
the structure of the experiment. The next three tasks (Tasks
2, 3, 4) evaluated limitations that we identiﬁed in the three
SOA anti-patterns, to learn if our IA anti-patterns were more
effective in those scenarios. In task 2, Star height > 1 may
produce a false positive, assessing the regex as IA. In task
3, QOA may produce a false negative, assessing the regex
as non-IA. In task 4, QOD may produce a false negative.
Finally, task 5 evaluated a scenario in which the SOA antipatterns are successful, to learn if our IA anti-patterns are
comparable in such a scenario. We expected both sets of
anti-patterns to perform equally in tasks 1 and 5, and our
IA anti-patterns to be more effective in tasks 2, 3, and 4.
Within-Subjects Protocol: Our protocol had three steps:
(1) Training: We shared background information in: (i)
regex syntax and useful terminology, so that they knew
correct regex syntax; and (ii) regex ambiguity and ReDoS,
so that they understood the practical utility of the task and
thus increase their engagement. (2) First set of anti-patterns:
We taught subjects one set of anti-patterns. They completed
the 5 regex composition tasks, producing a regex that is
not IA, using the given anti-patterns. (3) Second set of antipatterns: We taught subjects the other set of anti-patterns.
They performed the same 5 tasks, in the same order, using
the other anti-patterns.
We let subjects ask clarifying questions. We asked them
to think aloud. The experiment took ∼1 hour per subject.
Subjects were compensated with a $15 gift card.

Summary for Experiment 1: Our IA anti-patterns correctly
identiﬁed IA regexes with substantially higher effectiveness
(100% precision, 99% recall) than the SOA anti-patterns
(50% precision, 87% recall).

8. Experiment 2: Effectiveness when Applied
by Humans

Subjects: Subjects were recruited via posts on Twitter,
Reddit (r/regex), and our institutional mailing lists. We
asked subjects to report their years of professional soft
ware development and their experience with regexes (self
reported, based on popular regex features following Michael
et al. [46]). We had 27 respondents, and kept the 21 respon
dents who reported some experience in both categories. Af
ter performing the experiment, we discarded one additional
subject who composed incorrect regexes for 70% of the
tasks (they did not match the example inputs provided in the
speciﬁcation). Thus, in total, we analyzed the performance
of 20 subjects. We list their demographics in Table 7.

Our IA anti-patterns can identify IA regexes with high
precision and recall (§7), but their effectiveness may be
reduced when applied manually [31]. Here we report on
a human-subjects experiment evaluating the effectiveness of
our IA anti-patterns when applied manually.

8.1. Experimental Design
Overview: We asked 20 software developers to perform 5
regex composition tasks. To study a context in which devel
opers may prefer to apply IA anti-patterns manually [31],
we studied simple regex composition tasks. We followed a
within-subjects approach: each subject applied both our IA

Metrics: For each studied task and anti-pattern set, we mea
sured success using Detection Effectiveness: the percentage
of subjects that correctly identiﬁed whether their composed
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Table 8: Performance of subjects in Experiment 2: per
centage of subjects correctly using each anti-pattern set to
identify if their composed regex was IA.

Table 6: Regex composition tasks studied in Experiment 2.
Typical
solution

Task Description
1

2

3

SOA ﬁrst, IA after IA ﬁrst, SOA after
(N = 10)
(N = 10)

Write a regex to match one or more non-IA:
‘b’ followed by a single ‘c’. Example b+c
matching strings: bc, bbc, bbbbc, bbbbbc,
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbc

Task

Write a regex to match one or more non-IA:
repetitions of the following: one or more (b+c)+
‘b’ followed by a single ‘c’. Example
matching strings: bcbc, bbcbbcbbc, bbbb
bcbbbbbc,
bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb
bcbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbc

All

Write a regex to match one or more IA:
‘a’ or ‘b’, followed by one or more (a|b)+(ab)+
repetitions of ‘ab’. Example matching
strings: aab, bab, aaab, aaaaab, bab, bb
bab, aaaabababab, bbbbababababab

4

Write a regex to match one or more oc- IA:
currences of the strings ‘a’, ‘b’, or ‘ab’. (a|b|ab)+
Example matching strings: aaaaaaaaaa,
bbbbbbbbbbbb, ababababababababab

5

Write a regex to match one or more IA:
‘a’ followed by an optional ‘b’ followed (a+b?a+)
by one or more ‘a’. Example matching
strings: aaaabaa, aaaaa, abaaaa

Table 7: Demographics of Experiment 2: subjects’ experi
ence with software development, and with regexes.
Years Prof. Soft. Dev.
< 1 1-2
3-5
# Subjects

7

7

6

Exp. with Regexes
Novice Interm. Expert
9

11

SOA

1 100%
2 10%
3 20%
4 30%
5 100%

0

regex was IA. We used the same approach for ground truth
as in Experiment 1 (§7.1). Note that we did not measure
whether subjects ﬁxed the IA section in their regex, if any;
we measured the effectiveness of anti-patterns following the
goal of the original SOA anti-patterns — to identify IA.

52%

All orders
(N = 20)

IA

SOA

IA

SOA

IA

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

100%
0%
20%
20%
100%

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

100%
5%
20%
25%
100%

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

100%

48%

100%

50%

100%

8.2. Results
Table 8 summarizes our results for each order of application,
by each set of anti-patterns, for each task.
• Considering all tasks and treatment orders, subjects using
our IA anti-patterns achieved 100% detection effective
ness, improving on the SOA anti-patterns (50%).
• Our hypothesis test showed a statistically signiﬁcant im
provement (p < .00001).
• Our observed effect size was 50%, comparing the ﬁnal
columns in the bottom row of Table 8. Our power analysis
indicated that we studied a sufﬁcient number of subjects:
we needed 11 and studied 20.
As we expected (§8.1), the SOA anti-patterns showed their
limitations in tasks 2, 3, and 4 — regardless of the ordering.
Also as expected, both sets of anti-patterns achieved 100%
detection effectiveness for tasks 1 and 5, also regardless
of ordering. We conclude that our IA anti-patterns are as
effective as the SOA ones when they are not limited, and
much more effective than them when they are.
Summary for Experiment 2: Our IA anti-patterns outper
formed the SOA anti-patterns when applied manually (100%
vs. 50% effectiveness).

9. Experiment 3: Usability when Complement
ing Existing Tools

Statistical Tests: We validated our results using hypothesis
testing and power analysis.
Hypothesis testing. We used the null hypothesis: H0 : sub
jects using our IA anti-patterns achieve as much detection
effectiveness as those using the SOA anti-patterns. We tested
H0 using a Wilcoxon signed rank test [79] (since we cannot
assume a normal distribution of results, and our observations
are paired) over the IA assessments produced by our IA antipatterns and the SOA ones for all tasks and orders. If this
test returned a low p-value (p < 0.05), we rejected H0 .
Power analysis. We used power analysis to determine if
our sample size was sufﬁcient to support a statistically sig
niﬁcant expected effect size in detection effectiveness [80].
We looked for standard power of 0.8, standard statistical
signiﬁcance of p < 0.05, with our observed effect size (i.e.,
the difference in detection effectiveness using our IA antipatterns vs. using the SOA anti-patterns for all tasks and
orders).

Experiments 1 and 2 showed that our anti-patterns are
effective over a wide variety of regexes (§7), and can be
applied manually by humans (§8). However, developers may
prefer automatic tools, e.g., for complex regexes.
In Experiment 3, we studied whether our anti-patterns
and ﬁx strategies complement automatic tools for real-world
regexes. Our goal is not to replace existing automatic tools
(we hope developers use them!), but to complement them,
to increase developer understanding of the task outcome.

9.1. Experimental Design
Overview: We asked 9 software developers to perform realworld ReDoS detection and ﬁxing. They performed tasks
over their own regexes from open-source projects. They ﬁrst
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Table 9: Tasks of Experiment 3. Italics denote changing text
with each subject. Brackets denote subject answers.

used only an automatic tool, and then the tool combined
with our anti-patterns (for detection) and our ﬁx strategies
(for ﬁxing). Our design was within-subjects. We ﬁxed the
order so we could measure their (hypothesized) increase in
understanding after adding our approach.

Detection Task

Treatments: For detection, our subjects ﬁrst used a rep
resentative detection tool (Weideman et al.’s [19]), and
then complemented it with our anti-patterns. We studied
Weideman et al.’s approach because they provide a mature
implementation with many stars in GitHub. For ﬁxing, our
subjects ﬁrst used a representative ﬁxing approach (van der
Merwe et al.’s [27]), and then complemented it with our
anti-patterns and ﬁx strategies. We studied van der Merwe et
al.’s approach because it is the only existing ﬁxing approach
that does not modify the language accepted by the regex.4
To help these tools to perform their best, we trained our
subjects. For detection, we trained them on the purpose and
workings of Weideman’s detection tool, including the NFAbased characterizations of IA that it detects in the regex (see
Figure 1). For ﬁxing, we trained them on the purpose and
workings of Van Der Merwe’s algorithm, i.e., that it converts
the regex’s NFA to an equivalent unambiguous DFA, then
back to an equivalent regex. We also explained our antipatterns (Table 1) and ﬁx strategies (Table 2).

Output of auto
matic detection
tool

How
strongly
do
you understand what
makes
this
regex
vulnerable?

Explain
your
rea
soning

PDA
regex

Output of Weide
man’s detection
tool [19]

[Very strongly, Strongly,
Neutral, Weakly, Very
weakly, Not Vulnerable]

[. . . ]

EDA
regex

Output of Weide
man’s detection
tool [19]

[Very strongly, Strongly,
Neutral, Weakly, Very
weakly, Not Vulnerable]

[. . . ]

Non-IA
regex

Output of Weide
man’s detection
tool [19]

[Very strongly, Strongly,
Neutral, Weakly, Very
weakly, Not Vulnerable]

[. . . ]

Fixing Task

Their
vulnera
ble regex
in context

Tasks: Table 9 shows the tasks of Experiment 3.
Detection Task. We asked our subjects to detect vulnera
bility in 3 regexes, in a random order: a PDA regex, an EDA
regex, and a non-IA regex (see Figure 1). One of the PDA or
EDA regexes was the vulnerable one that we took from the
subject’s software project. For the other two regexes, we
used the same randomly chosen regexes from the dataset
studied in Experiment 1 (§7.1). For each regex, we showed
our subjects the output of Weideman’s detection tool, and
asked them how strongly they understood the vulnerability
in the regex. Then, we also showed them our anti-patterns,
asked them to identify the anti-pattern(s) that each regex ﬁts
(to prompt them to use the anti-patterns), and asked them
the same question again.
Fixing Task. We asked our subjects to ﬁx the vulnerability
in the regex that we took from their code. We showed them
their regex in the context of their project, and asked them
how strongly they understand it (to refresh their memory).
Then, we showed them the output of van der Merwe’s
approach: a non-IA version of their regex. We let them write
their own ﬁx or take/adapt van der Merwe’s, and we asked
them our understanding questions. Then, we also showed
them our anti-patterns and ﬁx strategies, again let them
modify their ﬁx if they choose to, and again asked them
our understanding questions.

Output of auto
matic ﬁxing tool

How
strongly
do
you
understand
what
makes
the
resulting ﬁxed regex
not vulnerable?

Explain
your
rea
soning

Output of van
der Merwe’s ﬁx
ing tool [27]

[Very strongly, Strongly,
Neutral, Weakly, Very
weakly, Not Vulnerable]

[. . . ]

ﬁxing [27] tools work. (2) Detection: We asked subjects
to detect IA in a set of regexes, ﬁrst using only existing
automatic tools, and then combining them with our antipatterns. (3) Fixing: We asked subjects to ﬁx an IA regex
that they wrote in their codebase to make it non-IA, ﬁrst
using only existing automatic tools, and then combining
them with our anti-patterns and ﬁx strategies.
We let subjects ask clarifying questions. We asked them
to think aloud. To simulate real-world conditions, we let
them use external resources, and showed them some re
sources: a web interface for the studied tools, and two
websites for regex understanding (www.regex101.com and
www.regexper.com). The experiment took ∼1 hour per sub
ject. Subjects were compensated with a $40 gift card.

Within-Subjects Protocol: Our protocol had three steps:
(1) Training: This training was more in-depth than Ex
periment 2 because the subjects had greater expertise. We
taught the technical details of ReDoS attacks (following [2]),
and showed the participants how the detection [19] and

Subjects: We recruited software developers that had writ
ten a vulnerable regular expression in the PyPi [81] and
NPM [82] software ecosystem. To increase response rate,
we scanned ∼200K PyPi projects and ∼40K NPM projects
with some popularity (at least 1 star) and with recent activity
(at least one commit since January 2020). We extracted their
regexes; discarded any in test ﬁles or dependencies; and
identiﬁed vulnerable regexes using Davis et al.’s ensemble
of ReDoS detectors [32], This process resulted in 120 vul
nerable regexes (99 from PyPI, 21 from NPM). We disclosed
these potential vulnerabilities to the 120 software developers
who last modiﬁed them. We invited those developers to
participate in our experiment. 9 of them agreed (8% response
rate) — demographics are in Table 10.

4. The algorithm of van der Merwe et al. does not include an open-source
implementation. Our implementation is included in our artifact.

Metrics: We measured the success of our anti-patterns
or ﬁx strategies as the increase in understanding that our
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Table 10: Demographics of Experiment 3: subjects’ experi
ence with software development, and with regexes.
Years Prof. Soft. Dev.
3-5 6-10
> 10
# Subjects

1

1

nerability, improving over using existing tools only (me
dian “Very weakly”).
• Our hypothesis test showed a statistically signiﬁcant im
provement (p < 0.05).
• Our observed effect size was mean 2.1 Likert points —
bottom bar in Figure 2. Our power analysis indicated that
we studied a sufﬁcient number of subjects: we needed 4
and studied 9.
Subjects also reported that the anti-patterns will be “Help
ful” (N = 4) or “Very helpful” (N = 5) for their future
detection efforts. The following quote describes their most
common sentiment: “I will use the tool to see if there is
something wrong, and with the anti-patterns I can try to
understand why there is a problem”.

Exp. with Regexes
Interm.
Expert

7

1

8

E isting tools onl
Anti-patterns and e isting tools
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
P9
AVG

Ver
eakl

Weakl

Ne tral

Strongl

Ver
strongl

E i ing ool onl
An i-pa ern , fi
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
P9
AVG

Figure 2: Detection Task: Subjects consistently reported
stronger understanding of what makes their regex vulnerable
when using our anti-patterns to complement existing tools.
subjects reported after applying them. We asked our subjects
the same question twice, once after applying each treatment.
We also asked them to explain their reasoning (see Table 9).
For detection, we asked them how strongly they un
derstood what makes the regex vulnerable, using a Likert
scale of: “Very strongly”, “Strongly”, “Neutral”, “Weakly”,
and “Very weakly” understand, and “Not vulnerable”. For
ﬁxing, we asked them how strongly they understood what
makes the resulting ﬁxed regex not vulnerable, using the
same scale. Finally, we asked them how helpful they found
the anti-patterns or ﬁx strategies for their future overall.

Ver
eakl

Weakl

ra egie , and ool

Ne

ral

S rongl

Ver
rongl

Figure 3: Fixing Task: Subjects consistently reported
stronger understanding of what makes their resulting ﬁxed
regex not vulnerable when they used our anti-patterns and
ﬁx strategies to complement existing tools.

Statistical Tests: We validated our results using hypothesis
testing and power analysis (as in §8.1).
Hypothesis testing. We set two null hypotheses. For
detection, H0 : Subjects using our IA anti-patterns in com
bination with existing tools report the same understanding
strength of what makes the regex vulnerable as those using
existing tools only. For ﬁxing, H0 : Subjects using our ﬁx
strategies in combination with existing tools report the same
understanding strength of what makes the ﬁxed regex not
vulnerable as those using existing tools only. We tested the
null hypothesis for each task using a Wilcoxon signed rank
test [79] (since we cannot assume a normal distribution of
results, and our observations are paired) over the reported
understanding scores for each treatment.
Power analysis. We again looked for standard power
of 0.8, standard statistical signiﬁcance of p < 0.05, and
measured effect size as the increase in mean reported un
derstanding for each task.

Fixing Task: Figure 3 shows our subjects’ reported under
standing of what makes the ﬁxed regex not vulnerable.
• Subjects using our anti-patterns and ﬁx strategies to com
plement existing tools reported median “Very strongly”
understanding, improving over using existing tools only
(median “Very weakly”).
• Our hypothesis test showed a statistically signiﬁcant im
provement (p < 0.05).
• Our observed effect size was mean 2.9 Likert points —
bottom bar in Figure 3. Our power analysis indicated that
we studied a sufﬁcient number of subjects: we needed 2
and studied 9.
Subjects also reported that the anti-patterns and ﬁx strategies
will be “Neutral” (N = 1), “Helpful” (N = 2), or “Very
helpful” (N = 6) for their future detection efforts. As an
example quote, one subject regarded the ﬁxing tool as: “The
output does not make a whole lot of sense to me”. Another
said of the ﬁx resulting from our ﬁx strategies: “I understand
why this is ambiguous and how the change ﬁxes it”. Finally,
almost all subjects (N = 8) were more comfortable ﬁxing
their codebase with the ﬁx produced using our ﬁx strategies
than with the one produced by the existing tool (Figure 5
in Appendix).

9.2. Results
Detection Task: We focus on how strongly subjects under
stood what makes their own regex vulnerable (see Figure 2).
• Subjects using our anti-patterns to complement existing
tools reported median “Strongly” understanding the vul

Summary for Experiment 3: Subjects using our IA antipatterns and ﬁx strategies to complement existing tools
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In Experiment 1 (§7), we evaluated the largest available
dataset of regexes [32].
In Experiment 2 (§8), our subjects had diverse levels
of professional software development experience. Their ex
perience with regexes was at the novice and intermediate
levels, but we studied regex experts in Experiment 3. We
studied simple composition tasks to represent situations
when developers may choose to apply anti-patterns man
ually, but they represented diverse scenarios. Furthermore,
our subjects composed solutions that were only slightly less
complex than typical real-world regexes according to [37].
For example, they had length 6-11 (median regex length
in Java: 15) and used 2-3 operators (Java: median 3). We
report the most common solution observed for each task in
Table 6. We also studied more complex real-world regexes
in Experiment 3.
In Experiment 3 (§9), we studied mostly regex experts
and complex real-world regexes to complement Experiment
2. We also made this experiment as realistic as possible by
having developers work with their own regexes, and giving
them free access to online resources.
Finally, both Experiment 2 and 3 studied a limited num
ber of subjects (N = 20 and N = 9). However, we observed
large effect sizes in our results, we did so consistently, they
were statistically signiﬁcant, and power analysis revealed
that fewer subjects would have been sufﬁcient.

reported much higher understanding, from median “Very
weakly” to median “Strongly” for detection, and to median
“Very strongly” for ﬁxing.

10. Threats to Validity
Internal Validity: We took multiple measures to increase
internal validity. In Experiment 1 (§7), we tested the imple
mentation scripts of our anti-patterns over small samples of
the dataset. We also curated our studied dataset to prepare it
for our experiments. We also used existing implementations
of tools where possible, viz. the SOA anti-patterns by Davis
et al. [2] and Weidemann et al.’s detector [19], to avoid
errors if implementing them ourselves.
In Experiment 2 (§8), we used best practices in humansubject experiment methodologies in its design, e.g., [83],
[84]. We piloted the protocol on 3 pilot studies, which
helped us clarify the language describing the tasks (pilot
1) and the technical terms in the training (pilot 2). Pilot
3 showed that our script was adequate. To reduce social
desirability bias, we did not disclose who created any of
the anti-patterns, and we referred to them in the third person
(Anti-patterns 1 and 2). To avoid expertise bias, we asked
subjects to apply the given anti-patterns irrespective of their
perception of their correctness. To avoid learning bias, 10
random subjects used the SOA anti-patterns ﬁrst, and the
other 10 used our IA anti-patterns ﬁrst.
In Experiment 3 (§9) we likewise used best practices in
design. We piloted the protocol on 3 subjects. After pilot 1,
we adjusted the number of tasks to reduce the experiment
duration. After pilots 2 and 3, we clariﬁed some terms in
the training. To reduce social desirability bias, we did not
disclose who created any of the tools or supplementary
approaches (even if we were asked); we referred to them
only as “Treatment 1” etc. Further, we separately and in
dependently asked subjects their understanding using one
treatment and then using the other (as opposed to asking
them to compare treatments). Having subjects individually
decide and assign a speciﬁc score to each treatment reduces
the possibility of them unconsciously preferring the last
treatment. To reduce expertise bias (e.g., higher understand
ing reported by more experienced subjects), all subjects
used both treatments. To reduce learning bias, subjects
used ﬁrst the treatment that we anticipated would provide
lower understanding, i.e., the existing tools. If subjects used
ﬁrst the treatment that truly provided higher understanding
(and second the one that truly produced lower), they would
misleadingly report higher understanding for the second
treatment; they cannot forget what they learned. Having the
combination of our anti-patterns, ﬁx strategies, and existing
tools as the last treatment may have unconsciously nudged
subjects to report higher understanding for them. However,
subjects reported much higher understanding for this last
treatment with statistical signiﬁcance, i.e., more likely due
to a real effect than to chance.

11. Conclusions
To secure software systems, developers need approaches
that are both sound and understandable. Prior to this pa
per, the approaches to address regular expression security
problems provided theoretical guarantees, but were difﬁcult
for developers to understand. Our goal was to complement
these existing approaches with understandable regex security
anti-patterns and ﬁx strategies. To that end, we developed a
novel theory of regex inﬁnite ambiguity that characterizes
vulnerable regexes to ReDoS, and a set of anti-patterns and
ﬁx strategies derived from it. Our evaluation showed that
our IA anti-patterns identiﬁed vulnerable regexes with much
higher effectiveness than the state-of-the-art anti-patterns,
both when applied automatically and manually. Our antipatterns and ﬁx strategies also substantially increased de
veloper understanding when used alongside existing tools
to detect and ﬁx vulnerable regexes. In the future, we plan
to apply this methodology to similar security problems in
domain-speciﬁc languages (e.g., in GraphQL [85]).
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Appendix A.
Replication Package

B.3.2. Theorem 1: Ambiguity of Alternation. Given un
ambiguous regexes R1 and R2 ,
(a) R1 |R2 is ﬁnitely ambiguous iff L(R1 ) ∩ L(R2 ) = φ.
(b) R1 |R2 cannot be inﬁnitely ambiguous.
The components of Theorem 1 follow from Lemma 1.

We have made our data and code publicly available for
replication [33].
It contains, for Experiment 1: i) the dataset used (§7.1),
ii) our implementation of Weideman’s detection tool [19]
used as ground truth (§7.1), and iii) the implementation of
our anti-patterns (§7.1). For Experiments 2 and 3: iv) the full
protocol used (§8.1 and §9.1), and v) our implementation
of van der Merwe’s ﬁxing tool [27] (§9.1). Finally, vi) the
analysis of prevalence of our ﬁx strategies (§6).

Lemma 1. Given unambiguous R1 and R2 , if R1 |R2 is
ambiguous it is always ﬁnitely ambiguous.
Proof. A string s may be matched against R1 |R2 in four
ways: s may be matched by R1 , by R2 , by both, or by
neither. In any case, since R1 and R2 are unambiguous,
there are at most two ways for R1 |R2 to match s.

Appendix B.
Proofs of the Theorems

B.3.3. Theorem 2: Ambiguity of Concatenation.
Suppose unambiguous regexes R1 and R2 , and that
L(R1 ) ∨
∩ L(R2 ) = φ (so R1 ·R2 is ambiguous by Theo
B.1. Deﬁnitions
rem 0). Then:
(a) R1 ·R2 is inﬁnitely ambiguous iff L(R1 ) contains the
We deﬁne the operators used in Theorems 2 and 3:
language of a regex BC*D and L(R2 ) contains the
language
of a regex EF*G, where E ∈
/ L(C) ∧ E ∈
/
B.1.1. ∨
∩ . Brabrand & Thomsen [38] introduced an overlap
L(
F
)
∧
L(
C
)
∩
L(
F
)
∩
L(
DE
)
=
φ
.
operator, ∨
∩ , between two languages L(R1 ) and L(R2 ).
(b) Otherwise, R1 ·R2 must be ﬁnitely ambiguous.
The set L(R1 ) ∨
∩ L(R2 ) contains the ambiguity-inducing
2(a) is an iff so we need to prove:
strings that can be parsed in multiple ways across L(R1 ) and
⇐= : If L(R1 ) contains the language of a regex BC*D
L(R2 ). More formally, with X = L(R1 ) and Y = L(R2 ),
and L(R2 ) contains the language of a regex EF*G, where
∗
+
X∨
∩ Y = {xay | x, y ∈ Σ ∧a ∈ Σ s.t. x, xa ∈ X∧ay, y ∈ Y } E ∈
/ L(C) ∧ E ∈
/ L(F) ∧ L(C) ∩ L(F) ∩ L(DE) = φ, then
R1 · R2 is inﬁnitely ambiguous.
B.1.2. Ω. Brabrand & Thomsen use Møller’s BRICS li
Proof. Consider a string q = bcm d ∈ L(BC*D) where b, d ∈
brary [73] for the implementation of their theorems, and
Σ∗ , c ∈ Σ+ , b ∈ L(B), c ∈ L(C), and d ∈ L(D). By
actually use what we call the “Møller overlap operator”, Ω.
hypothesis, L(BC*D) ⊆ L(R1 ), so q ∈ L(R1 ). Similarly,
We use this operator in our theorems. The Møller overlap
consider another string r = ef n g ∈ L(EF*G) where e, g ∈
operator describes only the ambiguous core “a”:
Σ∗ , f ∈ Σ+ , e ∈ L(E), f ∈ L(F), and g ∈ L(G). By
hypothesis, L(EF*G) ⊆ L(R2 ), so r ∈ L(R2 ). As L(C) ∩
X Ω Y = {∃ x, y ∈ Σ∗ ∧a | a ∈ Σ+ s.t. x, xa ∈ X∧ay, y ∈ Y } L(F) ∩ L(DE) = φ, suppose c = f = de.
Consider the new string p = qr = bcm def n g ∈
L(R
1 )·L(R2 ) = L(R1 ·R2 ). In other words, R1 ·R2 should
B.2. Assumptions
include the following NFA accepting p.
In our theorems and proofs, we assume that we can
convert regexes to their equivalent, ambiguity-preserving, Ec
f
g
free NFAs [19], [40].
b
d
e
...
...
v1
v2
v3

B.3. Theorems & proofs
For m = 2 and n = 2, p = bccdef f g . There are (m ×
n) + 1 = (2 × 2) + 1 = 5 ways to match. Ignoring preﬁx b
and sufﬁx g , the ﬁve cases to match the middle ccdef f are:
c
c
(de=c)
• v1 → v1 → v1 →
v1 →(f =c) v1 →(f =de) v3
c
c
(de=c)
• v1 → v1 → v1 →
v1 →(f =de) v3 →f v3
c
c
d
e
f
f
• v1 → v1 → v1 → v2 → v3 → v3 → v3
c
(c=de)
(de=f )
f
• v1 → v1 →
v3 →
v3 → v 3 → f v3
(c=de)
c=f
(de=f )
• v1 →
v3 →
v3 →
v3 →f v3 →f v3
where the superscript of an arrow represents the (input
observed = path taken) pair.
The degree of ambiguity grows for each larger m and
n. It can be shown that for an input string p = bcm def n g ,
there will be (m × n) + 1 ways to match. Here ambiguity is

Brabrand & Thomsen’s Theorem 0 [38] provides the
conditions for unambiguity. Our proofs consider the effect
of negating the unambiguity condition, and distinguish the
conditions that lead to ﬁnite or inﬁnite ambiguity.
B.3.1. Theorem 0: Brabrand & Thomsen’s [38] Theo
rem. Given unambiguous regexes R1 and R2 ,
(a) R1 |R2 is unambiguous iff L(R1 ) ∩ L(R2 ) = φ.
(b) R1 ·R2 is unambiguous iff L(R1 ) ∨
∩ L(R2 ) = φ.
(c) R1 ∗ is unambiguous iff E
∈
/
L(R1 ) ∧
L(R1 ) ∨
∩ L(R1 ∗) = φ.
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words, there are at least 2 = 21 ways to parse s (i.e., x ∈
L(R) then ay ∈ L(R∗); or xa then y ).
Now consider ss = (xay)(xay). Let x' = x, a' =
'
a, y = yxay then, ss = x' a' y ' . Then the following
conditions are true: (1) x' , y ' ∈ Σ∗ , (2) a' ∈ Σ∗ , (3)
x' , x' a' ∈ L(R), and (4) y ' , a' y ' ∈ L(R ∗ RR∗) ⊂ L(R∗).
For each xay there are at least 2 accepting paths. Therefore,
for ss there are at least 4=22 accepting paths, and the degree
of ambiguity grows for each additional concatenation of an
s. Therefore, R∗ is inﬁnitely ambiguous.

a function of the input length. Therefore, R1 ·R2 is inﬁnitely
ambiguous.
=⇒ : If R1 · R2 is inﬁnitely ambiguous, then L(R1 )
contains the language of a regex BC*D and L(R2 ) contains
the language of a regex EF*G, where E ∈
/ L(C)∧E ∈
/ L(F)∧
L(C) ∩ L(F) ∩ L(DE) = φ.

Proof. We will reason over an equivalent, ambiguitypreserving, E-free NFA [40]. The NFA of an inﬁnitely
ambiguous regex should include either a Polynomial or an
Exponential Degree of Ambiguity (PDA, EDA) section [40],
as shown in Figure 1.
We ﬁrst show that if R1 · R2 is inﬁnitely ambiguous,
then the NFA of R1 · R2 must contain a PDA (Figure 1(a)).
R1 and R2 are unambiguous, so none of them should have a
full EDA. Concatenating two regexes R1 · R2 cannot create
a new self loop of EDA. Thus, R1 · R2 must contain a PDA.
Consider the two nodes p with the loop π1 and q with the
loop π3 in Figure 1(a). As R1 and R2 are unambiguous, nei
ther R1 nor R2 can include both nodes p and q — because
then they would be inﬁnitely ambiguous (not unambiguous).
Therefore, R1 and R2 each should have a part of PDA;
and the partition will appear somewhere along the path π2
as the loops π1 and π3 cannot be newly introduced via
concatenation.
Each partition of PDA consists of a preﬁx, a loop, and a
sufﬁx, which can be mapped to a regex of the form PQ*R.
As a PDA is a part of the whole NFA, more generally,
we can conclude that (1) L(R1 ) contains the language of a
regex BC*D and (2) L(R2 ) contains the language of a regex
EF*G: i.e., L(BC*D) ⊆ L(R1 ) and L(EF*G) ⊆ L(R2 )
where E ∈
/ L(C) ∧ E ∈
/ L(F).
After concatenation, the full PDA can be represented by
a language of the form BC*DEF*G, where C* is mapped
to the ﬁrst loop π1 , DE to the path π2 , and F* to the
second loop π3 . Let s be the string that meets the PDA
path conditions: label(π1 ) = label(π2 ) = label(π3 ). Then,
s ∈ L(C) (by label(π1 )), s ∈ L(DE), and s ∈ L(F). And
thus L(C) ∩ L(F) ∩ L(DE) = φ.

B.3.5. Theorem 4: Finite to Inﬁnite. Given a ﬁnitely
ambiguous regex R, R∗ is always inﬁnitely ambiguous.
Proof. If R is ﬁnitely ambiguous by deﬁnition there exists
an input string s for which there will be at least 2 accepting
paths. For R∗, we can increase the length of input string
as much as we want because of the ∗. Now for input string
ss, there will be at least 4 = 22 accepting paths as we have
at least 2 options for each s. By the same logic, for input
string sss.... where length of the input string is n, there will
be at least 2n accepting paths.
Therefore, R∗ is inﬁnitely ambiguous.

B.4. Limitations
Our theorems do not cover the cases when R1 and
R2 are ﬁnitely ambiguous. In such scenario, our expec
tation is that Alternation (R1 |R2 ) would always yield a
ﬁnitely ambiguous regex. We also expect that Concatena
tion (R1 · R2 ) would still yield an inﬁnitely ambiguous
regex if L(R1 ) contains the language of a regex BC*D
and L(R2 ) contains the language of a regex EF*G, where
E∈
/ L(C) ∧ E ∈
/ L(F) ∧ L(C) ∩ L(F) ∩ L(DE) = φ. However,
whether this is the only case is less clear. Still, despite this
limitation, our theorems allowed us to derive anti-patterns
(§5) and ﬁx strategies (§6) that substantially improved the
effectiveness of the SOA ones (§7, §8), and the usability of
existing automatic detection and ﬁxing tools (§9).

Appendix C.
Other Figures

Theorem 2(b) follows from elimination with Theorem 0.
B.3.4. Theorem 3: Ambiguity of Star. Given unambiguous
regex R,
(a) R∗ is inﬁnitely ambiguous iff E ∈ L(R) ∨
L(R) Ω L(R∗) = φ.
(b) R∗ cannot be ﬁnitely ambiguous.
The components of Theorem 3 follow from Lemma 2.

C.1. CVEs Increasing Year by Year

Lemma 2. If R* is ambiguous, it is always inﬁnitely am
biguous.

C.2. Fix Acceptance

We observe annual growth in ReDoS CVEs from 2010
to the present. Figure 4 shows the trend of ReDoS CVEs
since 2010. The incidence of ReDoS CVEs grew from 2 in
2010 to 20 in 2021.

We asked the participants of Experiment 3 (§9) how
comfortable they were replacing the vulnerable regex in their
codebase with the ﬁxes provided by each repair treatment.
As shown in Figure 5, almost all subjects were more com
fortable with the ﬁx produced using our anti-patterns and
ﬁx strategies.

Proof. We prove this by induction. From the contrapositive
of Theorem 0(c), if R∗ is ambiguous, L(R) ∨
∩ L(R∗) = φ.
There exists an input string s = xay such that 1) x, y ∈ Σ∗ ,
2) a ∈ Σ+ , 3) x, xa ∈ L(R), 4) y, ay ∈ L(R∗). In other
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Figure 4: The data were obtained by a two-step process: a
preliminary labeling of the CVE database using key words
and phrases (e.g., “ReDoS” or “extremely long time” with
a reference to regular expressions), followed by a manual
inspection for accuracy.
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